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THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
Much present discussion about the Philosophy of Ameri-
can Law badly needs to be made more specific. Is the ques-
tion "What is the Philosophy of Law.in the United States?",
or is it rather "What ought such a Philosophy to be?" The
answer to the first question is largely one of fact - a fact
not altogether pleasing to the modern school of realistic
jurisprudence. Although the second question may or may
not do so, it usually does presume that the philosophy of law
in the United States is vague or non-existent. In this respect,
the second question usually begs the first, in which case the
answer is not anchored to anything except the force which
propels it, namely, the unsupported wish of the respondent.
For this reason, answers to the second question seldom, if
ever, coincide. Sixteen such answers are bound up in a vol-
ume published in 1941 under the title, "My Philosophy of
Law," 1 printed for the Julius Rosenthal Foundation at
Northwestern University. The distinguished authors of this
symposium appear to assume that a philosophy of law is a
purely personal credo about a persistent social manifesta-
tion called "law." The book contains no hint of the fact that
above and beyond the authors' opinions of what it "ought"
to be, a definite philosophy of law, explicit in its origin and
implicit in its growth and development, has characterized
our American Law from the very beginning of its history. If
lawyers, judges and law teachers of the greatest influence are
to write and speak of the Philosophy of Law as if it were
nothing more than the commentator's "slant" at broad social
aims and disciplines, then it is not surprising that the gen-
erality of our scholarship has come to regard American legal
philosophy as a tabula rasa, waiting for the original con-
tributions of Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Psy-
chology and finally Mathematics.
1 Boston Law Book Company, 1941.
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I do not think that the American Catholic Philosophical
Association should be misled by this popular heresy. Perhaps
the Philosophy of American Law ought to be something very
different from what it certainly is. Debate on this point
should not be foreclosed for we are just as competent to
change our legal philosophy now as we were to establish it
in the first place. Nevertheless, it is gross misrepresentation
for the advocates of a new legal philosophy, or no legal phi-
losophy at all, to act as if they were debating the possibilities
of a now vacant building site when, as a matter of fact, they
are proposing to destroy a very solid structure put together
with great pains and deliberation more than a century and
a half ago.
Any perfectly honest discussion of American Legal Philos-
ophy ought to revolve about such a question as the follow-
ing: "Should the American Philosophy of Law be abandoned
and, if so, what, if anything, should be substituted for it?"
This question presupposes the existence of a definite Phi-
losophy of Law in and for the United States of America. Let
us first see what this philosophy is and then inquire into the
reasons why its very existence is so persistently ignored by
the great majority of those who write upon the subject of
American jurisprudence.
In the process of this identification, no useful purpose will
be served by conducting the investigation through the long
and tortuous corridors of -English and Continental European
history. American legal philosophy is an historical develop-
ment in the same narrow and strictly revolutionary sense that
Communism is an historical development. In the history of
Czarist Russia, for example, one may find at least some of
the causes and motivations of modern Russian Communism;
however, no serious student of Communist Philosophy will
waste much time analyzing the "reforms" of Peter the Great.
In like manner, we may explain how and why our legal phi-
losophy came about if we study its English and American
background, but we completely frustrate the legal-phil-
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osophical significance of one of the most important events of
all history, namely, the American Revolution, when we think
and speak of American jurisprudence as a modern projec-
tion of the English Common Law. Nevertheless, during the
present century there has been a constantly strengthening
disposition on the part of American teachers and writers to
destroy, or at least obscure, the completely revolutionary
legal philosophy contained in the American Declaration of
Independence. The persistence and strength of these ob-
scurantists has finally given them command over the present
generation of American legal scholarship. These commanders
act, write and teach law just as if the American Declaration
of Indepedence had never been written.
From time to time I have asked some of the more per-
sistently voluble leaders of the obscurantists school to ex-
plain their so-called historical jurisprudence theory in the
light of the revolutionary postulates of the Declaration. The
answer is always the same, namely, the Declaration of In-
dependence is, or was, a political document and, as such, it
does not enter into or in any manner disturb the unbroken
continuity with which English law has flowed into the chan-
nels of modern American jurisprudence.
To say the very least, this is an extremely naive predicate
upon which to launch and sustain what amounts to a com-
plete counter-revolution in American Law. If it exists at all,
the line that separates legal and political documentation is
exceedingly fine and, when one attempts to use that line for
any practical purpose, it is found to have all the consistency
of a sturdy and very much alive angleworm. Planks from
political platforms often leap directly into our codes and just
as a statesman is said to be a politician who has died, it may
be just as truly said that a constitution is a political docu-
ment implemented by sanctions and enforcement machinery.
The success of the Americaln Revolution changed the Dec-
laration of Independence from a pious aspiration into a def-
inite working philosophy of law and government. By all
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standards, it is the clearest and most unequivocal definition
of man's relationship to God, his Government, and his fel-
low man that is to be found in the law of any people on earth.
The Declaration was a completely revolutionary document
in that it not only repudiated the governance of England,
but,-at the same time, affirmatively established an hitherto
completely untried theory of the State. For the foundation
of this new theory, it went far beyond Locke's Law of Na-
ture to much higher ground, namely "The Laws of * * *
Nature's God." It did not merely abandon all pretexts. con-
cerning the so-called "rights of Englishmen," it affirmatively
postulated the God-given rights of man, as man, and formed
law and government into a special agency to make these
rights secure. Pursuant to this end and object, the new, free
and independent states immediately set about the drafting
of their several constitutions and laws. It was to be expected,
of course, that the resultant political methods and legal pro-
cedures would be those with which they had become familiar
as English colonies, but the objects, sanctions and philosoph-
ical principles of the new governments, were the complete re-
verse of those of England.
In what is perhaps the earliest Federal decision (1795)
declaring an act of a State legislature repugnant to the Con-
stitution and therefore void,2 the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Pennsylvania District said: "In England from
whence most of our legal principles and legislative notions
are derived, the authority of the Parliament is transcendent
and has no bounds." The decision then quotes Blackstone as
follows: "The power and jurisdiction of Parliament, says Sir
Edward Coke, is so transcendent and absolute, that it can-
not be confined, either for causes or persons, within any
bounds * * *. It has sovereign and uncontrollable authority
in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating,
repealing, reviving and expounding of laws, concerning mat-
ters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal,
2 vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dallas 304 (1795).
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civil, military, maritime or criminal: this being the place
where that absolute, despotic power which must in all gov-
ernments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the Constitution
of these Kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations
and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws
are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can
regulate or new model the succession to the crown, as was
done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter
the established religion of the land, as was done in a variety
of instances in the reigns of King Henry VIII- and his three
children. It can change and create afresh even the Consti-
tution of the Kingdom and of Parliaments themselves, as
was done by the Act of Union, and the several statutes for
triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do every-
thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some
have not scrupled to call its power by a figure rather too
bold, the omnipotence of Parliament. True it is, that what
Parliament doeth, no authority upon earth can undo." 1
Blackstone Commentaries 160. The Circuit Judge then goes
on to say: "From this passage it is evident that, in England,
the authority of the Parliament runs without limits and rises
above control. It is difficult to say what the Constitution of
England is, because, not being reduced to written certainty
and precision, it lies entirely at the mercy of the Parliament;
it bends to every governmental exigency; it varies and is
blown about by every breeze of legislative humor or political
caprice. Some of the judges in England have had the bold-
ness to assert that an Act of Parliament made against nat-
ural equity is void; but this opinion contravenes the general
position that the validity of an Act of Parliament cannot
be drawn into question by the judicial department; it can-
not be-disputed and must be obeyed. The power of Parlia-
ment is absolute and transcendent; it is omnipotent in the
scale of political existence. Besides, in England, there is no
written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible,
nothing certain by which a statute can be tested (Italics
mine). In America the case is widely different: every State
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in the Union has its Constitution reduced to written exacti-
tude and precision."
The "widely different" case of America is precisely at-
tributable to the Declaration of Independence: the Ameri-
can philosophy of law and of government as distinguished
from that of England. Pursuant to the postulates of the Dec-
laration and in keeping with its philosophy, the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania (under consideration in the instant
case), had been written and adopted. After reading the per-
tinent Articles of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Cir-
cuit Judge proceeds to say: "From these passages it is evi-
dent that the fight of acquiring and possessing property and
having it protected is one of the natural inherent and in-
alienable rights of man * * *. The legislature therefore had
no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his
freehold and vesting it in another without a just compensa-
tion * * * it is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. * * * If this be the legislation of a republican
government I ask wherein it differs from the mandates of an
Asiatic prince? Omnipotence in legislation is despotism."
Contrast this concluding sentence with Blackstone's quo-
tation of Sir Edward Coke, cited heretofore, namely: "The
power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendent and
absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or per-
sons, within any bounds * * *." It was the Declaration of
Independence that spelled out this revolutionary departure
of American from English jurisprudence. Quite obviously, if
the rights of man are inalienable and God-given, they may
not be taken by any government whether that government
be republican, democratic, or otherwise constituted. It is for
this reason that American courts have consistently taken the
position that the validity and binding character of govern-
mental acts may be reviewed by the Court upon the petition
of an agrieved individual and disregarded as invalid if the act
is found to be in violation of the petitioner's rights. Our sys-
tem of constitutional law is unique in this respect but it is
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remarkable, to say the least, that even the most ardent de-
fenders of this "judicial review" seldom, if ever, invoke its
only philosophical justification, namely, the self-evident
truths of the American Declaration of Independence.
For more than 100 years following the time of Vanhorne's
Lessee v. Dorrance, the revolutionary philosophy of Ameri-
can Law was frequently quoted and affirmed by our State
and Federal Courts. As late as 1896, we find Justice Brewer
speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States as fol-
lows: I "The first official action of this nation declared the
foundation of government in these words: 'We hold these
truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are in-
stituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed ....'
"While the declaration of principle contained in the Dec-
laration of Independence may not have the force of organic
law or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits
of right and duty and while in all cases reference must be
had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the
latter is but the body and letter of which the former is the
thought and the spirit and it is always safe to read the let-
ter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence." The "thought and spirit" referred to by Jus-
tice Brewer constitutes the legal philosophy of all Govern-
ment, both State and Federal, in the United States. "The
very highest duty of the States when they entered the
Union," wrote Chief Justice Waite, in United States v.
Cruikskank,4 "was to protect all persons within their bound-
aries in the enjoyment of these 'inalienable rights' with
which they were endowed by their Creator."
8 Gulf, C. and S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. Ed. 666 (1897).
4 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1876).
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Our Nineteenth Century judges took the legal philosophy
of the American Declaration of Independence as a "self-
evident truth." So also did the framers of the -forty-eight
existing State Constitutions, all of which expressly recognize
the existence of God or the natural inalienable rights of man,
or both. At the turn of the century "lay morality" and secu-
larized concepts of everything, including law and govern-
ment, laid hold of the American intelligentia. From that
point on, we began to hear less and less about the American
Declaration of Independence, even on the occasion of 4th of
July celebrations. Natural Law was discussed and appraised
academically as a sort of way station on the evolutionary
road of human progress. Such discussion is now being revived
and some of those engaging in it even hazard the suggestion
that the remnants of Natural Law should be salvaged and
put to work.5
The schoolmen of the new secularism refused to dignify
the Declaration of Independence by a direct refutation.
They were content to dismember the Natural Law doctrines
of such writers as Locke and Montesquieu on the assump-
tion that the philosophy of the Declaration of Independence
must then fall to pieces by inference. The good faith of these
commentators is seriously in question. For instance, one
cannot believe that these scholarly researchers could over-
look the patent distinction between the Law of Nature as
expounded by Locke and "The Laws of Nature's God" in-
voked by the Declaration of Independence. The confusion
of these two radically different concepts of Natural Law
must have been as deliberate as the repeated citation of dis-.
parity in individual talents, virtues, opportunities and ac-
quisitions to refute the assertion of the Declaration of In-
dependence that "All men are created equal." "'We hold
these truths to be self- evident; that all men are created
equal.' Everything we have learned about human heredity
5 The Revival of Natural Law, Roscoe Pound, The Notre Dame Lawyer,
Vol 17, p. 287, 1942.
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challenges this statement in our Declaration of Independ-
ence. While genetics gives no support to the concept of hered-
itary superior or inferior classes, neither does it support the
theory of genetic equality. We have been shown beyond the
shadow of doubt that individuals are ushered into the world
with every type of human inequality in body and mind, and
when we add to this the obvious inequalities in environment
and opportunity we are forced to conclude that the state-
ment of our Founding Fathers was a flight of poetic fancy
(as indeed they may have meant it to be)." 6
The distinction between being "born" equal and being
created equal is the obvious difference between a litter of
healthy pups and a family of children. To be "created equal"
implies equality only in the sight of God, the Creator. Hun-
dreds of writers, like the author of "You and Heredity," who
persist in reading "created equal" in the sense of gentic
equality are saying in effect that signers of the Declaration
of Independence -were either the blindest of fools or deliber-
ate and lying propagandists. The express language of the
Declaration shows that they were neither. The signers were
something else, which is apparently equally incomprehen-
sible to the "Geneticists," namely, they were men of Faith
- Religious Faith if you please.
What the skeptics (who deny that there can be such a
thing as "truth," and particularly "self-evident truth") and
the secularists (who wish to separate government from any
connection with God or Religion) unite upon is the campaign
to utterly suffocate the all too obvious theology which thor-
oughly permeates the American philosophy of law and gov-
ernment. This well-managed plan of suffocation began to be
discernible forty or fifty years ago. The definitely-accom-
plished separation of Church from State was then deliber-
ately confused with the project to separate Religion from
Law and Government, which is a very different kind of sep-
6 "You and Heredity," Amram Sheinfeld (p. 366), Frederick A. Stokes Com-
pany, N. Y. C.
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aration indeed. Whatever may be said of the separation of
Church from State, one has but to read the Declaration of
Independence to see that the withdrawal of God and Reli-
gion from American Jurisprudence would not only subtract
the substance from our governmental system but would like-
wise destroy the traditional utility of its remaining form. A
man cannot be "endowed" by a Creator whose very existence
is denied and without this fundamental starting point, name-
ly, the God-given, natural inalienable right of the individual
personality, our revolutionary constitutional system, con-
ceived as a limitation upon an agency government, falls of
its own weight.
Father William Obering addresses himself to this identical
point in his masterful treatise on the Philosophy of Law
of James Wilson.' He says: "If the natural rights of man
are denied, it is perfectly true to say, as Justice Wilson re-
marks, that he 'is not only made for but by the government.'
For under such a principle, man does not differ essentially
as far as his juridical position is concerned from the animals
on the State Experimetnal Farm because the juridical differ-
ence between them is one established by the good pleasure
of the State and may be wiped out by the same good pleas-
ure .... If the citizen then has no rights which the State is
bound to respect as granted by the higher natural law, he
may call himself by whatever name he pleases, but he is the
chattel-slave of the State of whom the State may dispose in
the general interest as it disposes of any animal. For he
ceases to be, in Justice Wilson's fine phrase, 'a natural per-
son formed by the great Author of Nature' and becomes the
nameless creature of the State."
Where government is unlimited, no subject of such gov-
ernment is truly free. Limited government is thus the re-
7 Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Society, Vol.
I, p. 89.
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ciprocation of human freedom. It must be observed, how-
ever, that the limitation of American Government is not com-
prised solely of restrictions upon the area of its activities,
but it is likewise involved in the narrowly restricted objec-
tives of American Government within those areas to which
it is assigned. ". . . To secure these rights governments are
instituted among men," says the Declaration. American Gov-
ernment thus becomes at all times and in all places where it.
may constitutionally go, a protective agency for the preser-
vation of God's gifts. It derives its "just powers" (but not
its ends and its objects) from the Consent of the Governed.
Democracy is to spend itself in bestowing upon the State
the just and necessary powers with which it is to attain its
unalterable ends.
The evil of Dictatorship consists not in the fact that it is
"democratic" or "undemocratic," nor in the name by which
it may be currently called, nor in the refinement of its ruth-
lessness. The evil of such Dictator Government consists in
its assumption that it is the source of all of the rights and
privileges enjoyed by'those under its jurisdiction. Neither
the benevolence of such a government nor the happiness of
its subjects can obscure the fatal, ethical defect in its com-
position and nature. Such k government is a false god. Its
existence profanes a sacred thing, namely, the origin, nature
and eternal responsibility of the individual human soul.
Philosophically, its profanity is all that is wrong with Dic-
tatorship. Nevertheless, and strange to say, profanity is the
one charge that is not seriously made against modern dic-
tators. Why have its enemies elected not to shoot Dictator-
ship in the heart? For the reason that too many of the prin-
cipal spokesmen of these "enemies of dictatorship" and
"friends of democracy" hold with the dictum of the late
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that men are not "souls" at
all but merely a "complex of energies," of which a certain
one "4can wag its tail" and another "can make syllogisms."
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These spokesmen know that if they should send a philoso-
phical arrow into the heart of Hitlerism, for instance, the
missile would not be kind enough to stop there but would fly
on to the accomplishment of other important casualties. Such
a shaft would scatter and confuse the highly influential
school of realistic jurisprudence which-holds that law is what
government does. It would likewise hit and disburse the band
of skeptics and secularists who have fought with marked
success to obscure the deeply religious nature of American
jurisprudence while they feverishly adjust the forms and
procedures of our legal system to accommodate an adminis-
trative absolutism under the command of the "intellectuals."
Few, if any, of these jurisprudential realists, skeptics and
secularists are tyrants at heart or by nature. Their social
objectives are praiseworthy and, in most instances, unas-
sailable, but their jurisprudence is completely alien to Ameri-
can legal-philosophical traditions for the short and simple
reason that the government they envision -is a source of
blessings rather than a servant of pre-existing individual
rights. It is precisely their peculiar philosophy of "demo-
cratic" absolutism that is responsible for the rapidly con-
gealing stratifications of class consciousness that are. now
all too obvious throughout the population of our country.
It is contemplated that, in the approved Marxian manner,
each class must completely absorb the individual personality
of its members and that in the subsequent and inevitable
clash of classes, the "most numerous" 8 class will survive.
This is the established technique of all dictatorship - names
and pretended distinctions to the contrary notwithstanding.
Blocking the path of this "progressive liberalism" is the
American philosophy of law and government. It is the theo-
logical virtue of this American jurisprudence that it first
recognizes and then seeks to preserve man qua man. In this
8 This is apparently where the "democracy" comes in.
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manner, it guards the safety and happiness of the entire
group from the heart to the perimeter of society rather than
vice versa. Without a widespread, clear and faithful ac-
knowledgment of God's purposes in the creation of mankind
and the world, no such legal philosophy can be long sus-
tained. When religious faith is gone, such a system of juris-
prudence will have automatically disappeared.
The "reformers" know that religion is the chief obstacle
to the accomplishment of their political and legal objectives,
hence the painstaking care that they consistently take to
completely secularize their plans and promises of "heaven
on earth." In order to survive this clever flank attack, the
American philosophy of law must be generally and clearly
understood. The man in the street must be made to know
that -faith and freedom are inseparable and that a secular
"liberalism" is preparing to sell him into slavery. For the
purpose of this immediately necessary education in the truly
religious philosophy of American law and government noth-
ing will serve our purpose better than a popularization of
the self-evident truths taken verbatim from the language of
the Declaration of Independence itself. Fortunately, there
is in this language the great genius of simplification. The
principles described are clear and there is a comforting dog-
matic finality about them. Far from the "flight of poetic
fancy" and the "glittering generalities" that the skeptics
have represented them to be, the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence are both definite and specific. There is
no reasonable and moral social objective that will not re-
spond to their simple formula for the adjustment of human
and governmental relationships in the bright light of God's
creative purpose. If, as Christopher Dawson says,9 "we need
a political philosophy that is more catholic and more humane
one which does not exclude or depreciate the non-econom-
9 "Religion and the Modem State," Sheed and Ward, p. 43.
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ic functions and values, but which treats man as a free moral
personality, the creature of God and .the maker of his own
destiny," the answer is that we in the United States have
such a philosophy and have had it from the very beginning
of our history as an independent state. Now, more than at
any previous time since its establishment here, this philos-
ophy needs to be brought out of hiding and put seriously to
work.
Clarence E. Manion.
University of Notre Dame.
